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Piracy may be viewed to have a romantic past but modern 
piracy is a serious problem facing the world today. As it 
becomes increasingly prevalent, piracy harms the world economy 
with increased costs and dangers to the shipping industry. To 
assist navies in preventing and deterring piracy, the free market 
should be allowed to provide private security measures, such as 
armed guards, to assist in anti-piracy efforts. However, shipping 
companies cannot invoke the services of private security 
companies’ armed guards until countries dismantle legal 
barriers. Right now, countries have anti-gun laws that restrict 
flagships from having guns on board and coastal countries have 
anti-gun policies restricting ships passing through their 
territorial waters from enlisting the help of armed guards. 
Additionally, armed guards cannot be protected by a self-defense 
claim if they kill a pirate attempting to attack their ship. To best 
dismantle these laws, an organization, such as the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), should create cohesive, unified 
policies outlining the requirements and restrictions for ships 
carrying armed guards. With the support of the IMO, these new 
regulations can make it possible for merchant ships to protect 
themselves from pirates and hijackings. This will in turn bolster 
the efforts of navies and alleviate pressure on the world 
economy.            
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I. Introduction 
On the night of December 5th, 2001, pirates stormed a 130-foot 
expedition vessel off the coast of Brazil.1 Pirates ran through the 
vessel shouting and demanding money.2 Soon, gunfire broke out, and 
Sir Peter Blake was shot twice in the back. The pirates stole cameras 
1. See Herb McCormick, On Yachting; Peter Blake’s Legacy Spans the 
World, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/ 
12/07/sports/on-yachting-peter-blake-s-legacy-spans-the-world.html 
(describing the accomplishments and legacy of Sir Peter Black). 
2. See Salt of Earth and Ocean America’s Cup Hero and Environmentalist 
Sir Peter Blake is Murdered by Brazilian Pirates, TIME, Dec. 17, 2001, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2047863,00.html. 
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and Omega watches3 and left one of the world’s greatest yachtsmen 
dead at age fifty three.4 Blake’s friend, Australian yachtsman Chris 
Packer, learned a hard lesson that night. Thus, three years later, 
when Chris embarked on his around-the-world tour, he made sure to 
carry firearms to repel pirates.5 Twice pirates boarded his ship and 
twice Packer used his firearms for protection.6 While in port in Bali, 
Indonesia, government officials boarded Packer’s yacht and arrested 
him for gun running, a capital offense.7 Packer sat in a Bali jail 
uncertain if he would face a firing squad. After three long months, the 
Indonesian government set Packer free.8        
Today, piracy is becoming more prevalent and dangerous.9 
Modern piracy is more serious than the piracy of the 1800s because 
instead of focusing on robbery and taking vessels, pirates now take 
hostages for high ransoms.10 Pirate attacks doubled in 2008,11 and 
again in 2009.12 In 2010, pirate attacks decreased in number; however, 
total ransoms increased, making piracy as profitable as ever.13 The 
year 2011 closed with 439 pirate attacks and forty-five hijackings 
worldwide.14 As of March 2013, forty-four pirate attacks had already 
been attempted.15 As shocking as these statistics are, even more 
3. Funeral of Yachting Hero, BBC, Dec. 14, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk 
/2/hi/uk_news/england/1710485.stm 
4. See McCormick, supra note 1. 
5. See John Velleco, Gun Control on the High Seas, GUN OWNERS OF 
AMERICA (Apr. 13, 2009, 15:38), http://gunowners.org/gun-control-on-
the-high-seas.htm.  
6. See id. 
7. See id. 
8. See id. 
9. See Roger Williams University, Piracy and International Law Panel 
featuring Eugene Kontorovich, YOUTUBE (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=eDqJJ0eYk1M [hereinafter Piracy Panelist]. 
10. See Jennifer S. Martin, Fighting Piracy with Private Security Measures: 
When Contract Law Should Tell Parties to Walk the Plank, 59 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1363, 1367 (2010). 
11. Piracy Panelist, supra note 9. 
12. Matt Brown, Somali Pirate Attacks Nearly Double in 2009, THE 
NATIONAL (UAE), Jan. 20, 2010, http://www.thenational.ae/news/ 
world/africa/somali-pirate-attacks-nearly-double-in-2009.  
13. Piracy Panelist, supra note 9. 
14. Piracy Attacks in East and West Africa Dominate World Report, ICC 
COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVS. (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.icc-
ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsafigures. 
15. Piracy & Armed Robbery News & Figures, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME 
SERVS., http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsafigu 
res (last updated Feb. 27, 2013).  
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shocking is the fact that these incidents often go unreported.16 
Countries do not report pirate attacks for fear of being seen as having 
a “piracy problem,” 17 while ship owners simply pay ransoms to avoid 
insurance hikes.18 Moreover, the extreme duress caused by pirate 
attacks often makes victim accounts unreliable, causing attack reports 
to be even more undependable.19   
The current method of defeating piracy through interdiction alone 
cannot be successful. Navy patrols have limited effectiveness because 
navies cannot be omnipresent.20 Capturing pirates is difficult; 
prosecuting and punishing them is even harder.21 Universal 
jurisdiction should theoretically make pirate prosecutions easy, but 
few countries are willing to prosecute pirates.22 If pirates are found 
guilty, the country that hosted the trial must find an appropriate 
punishment.23 However, the punishment is usually more luxurious 
than the lifestyle of a pirate, thereby creating a reverse deterrent 
effect.24   
This Note focuses on the need for commercial ships to take 
proactive measures against piracy by hiring armed guards and the 
benefits and legal obstacles of doing so. Initially, this Note explains 
the reemergence of piracy in modern society. Next, it examines the 
importance of navy efforts to address piracy. While these efforts are 
16. See id.  
17. Ursula Daxecker & Brandon Prins, Insurgents of the Sea: Institutional 
and Economic Opportunities for Maritime Piracy 13 (unpublished 
article), available at http://ursuladaxecker.weebly.com/uploads/2/6/1/8 
/2618117/prins_and_daxecker_04-18-11.pdf. 
18. See id. 
19. Id. 
20. Lucas Bento, Toward an International Law of Piracy Sui Generis: How 
the Dual Nature of Maritime Piracy Law Enables Piracy to Flourish, 29 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 399, 410 (2011) (noting that the navy cannot 
protect each of the 33,000 cargo ships that pass over a million square 
miles of pirate rich waters). 
21. See Piracy Panelist, supra note 9. Navies only have a ten to fifteen 
minute window in which pirates can be captured before committing an 
attack. Id. 
22. See id. (noting that 90% of captured pirates are released). Western 
countries find it difficult to adapt their criminal trials to an irregular 
criminal force. Trial expenses accumulate quickly when witnesses and 
evidence are rarely close to a nation capable of prosecuting pirates. Few 
countries are willing to pay for this cost. Id. 
23. See id. 
24. See id. When in prison convicted pirates have warm shelter and good 
food. Once released from prison, pirates claim asylum in the country 
they were held. This is particularly a problem in Europe where the 
pirates are usually out of prison before their thirtieth birthday. Id. 
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necessary, this Note demonstrates why navies cannot be the sole 
defense mechanism against piracy and why armed guards must be 
utilized. Accordingly, countries must change their domestic gun laws 
for flagships and ports while enabling armed guards to use self-
defense. This Note advocates for a collective diplomatic approach to 
adopt unified regulations for ships with armed guards to follow. 
Finally, this Note will explain why critics’ fears that this solution will 
lead to increased violence by “mercenaries” are unfounded.      
II. PIRACY REEMERGES IN A GLOBAL SOCIETY 
After the heyday of piracy in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, it nearly disappeared.25 Piracy had previously 
been encouraged by states as a way to attack enemies,26 but in the 
late seventeenth century, naval wars ended and the need for state-
sponsored piracy ceased.27 Countries began treating piracy as a 
crime28 and navies began targeting pirates.29  
But in the 1980s, the explosion of world trade and shipping, made 
piracy a profitable business again.30 This reemergence first occurred 
off the coast of Southeast Asia, particularly in the Strait of Malacca, 
one the world’s key shipping routes.31 This narrow body of water, 
through which 50% of the world’s oil passes each year, makes the 
strait an easy and profitable target for pirates.32  
Piracy next resurfaced off the coast of Somalia.33 The country’s 
weak government, poor economy, and lack of coastal police patrol 
contributed to a swell in piracy.34 Currently, three independent 
governments fracture Somalia: Puntland, Transitional Federal 
25. See Daxecker & Prins, supra note 17, at 4–5. 
26. Lawrence Azubuike, International Law Regime Against Piracy, 15 ANN. 
SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 43, 46 (2009) (noting the similarity to state-
sponsored terrorism today). 
27. Milena Sterio, Fighting Piracy in Somalia (and Elsewhere): Why More 
Is Needed, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 372, 378 (2010). 
28. See id.; see also Azubuike, supra note 26, at 46. 
29. See Sterio, supra note 27, at 378. 
30. See Daxecker & Prins, supra note 17, at 5; see also Bruce A. Elleman & 
Andrew Forbes, Introduction, in PIRACY AND MARITIME CRIME: 
HISTORICAL AND MODERN CASE STUDIES 2 (2010) (noting the correlation 
between trade and increase of piracy).  
31. See Sterio, supra note 27, at 381. 
32. See id. at 381–82 (describing numerous attacks that occurred in the 
Strait of Malacca). 
33. Id. at 382. 
34. See Bento, supra note 20, at 405. 
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Government (TFG), and Somaliland.35 These governments have been 
unsuccessful in their battle against pirates.36 Puntland not only 
harbors one of the major pirate organizations, but its leaders have 
known ties to pirates.37 The Somali TFG has internationally 
recognized jurisdiction off its coast but it cannot control the 
territory.38 Somaliland most successfully fights against piracy, but it 
lacks recognition as an independent country by any foreign 
government.39   
Many individuals are attracted to piracy. Pirate recruits are often 
from professions with transferrable maritime skills, such as fishermen, 
sailors, and taxi-boat captains.40 Decreased economic opportunities in 
poor countries such as Somalia create an added incentive for these 
individuals to turn to piratical acts.41 Ninety percent of the world’s 
trade travels on the slow, vulnerable merchant vessels that frequently 
transit through tight trade routes,42 allowing piracy to become a 
successful and viable career choice, especially for those in economic 
distress.43  
Piracy can be highly organized.44 After September 11, 2001, 
international authorities focused attention on preventing a similar 
attack at sea.45 Al-Qaeda showed its maritime terrorism capabilities 
35. Theodore T. Richard, Reconsidering the Letter of Marque: Utilizing 
Private Security Providers Against Piracy, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 411, 443 
(2010). 
36. See id. at 446. 
37. See id. at 443–46. Puntland made efforts to curtail piracy by hiring 
private security companies, but the government hindered the security 
companies’ success by supporting the piracy they hired the security 
guards to defeat. Id. 
38. See id. at 443, 447.  
39. See id. at 449.  
40. See Daxecker & Prins, supra note 17, at 9–10. 
41. Id. at 10.  
42. See John S. Burnett, The Next 9/11 Could Happen at Sea, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 22, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/22/opinion/22bu 
rnett.html (noting the Suez and Panama Canals, the Bab el Mandeb, 
the Straits of Gibraltar and the Malacca Strait as “the world’s choke 
points”). 
43. See Daxecker & Prins, supra note 17, at 11. 
44. See Tina Garmon, International Law of the Sea: Reconciling the Law of 
Piracy and Terrorism in the Wake of September 11th, 27 TUL. MAR. 
L.J. 257, 266 (2002) (discussing sophisticated piracy rings that fund 
large operations).  
45. See id. at 273–74.  
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with attacks on the USS Cole46 and the French supertanker 
Limburg.47 Indonesian pirates also attacked the Dewi Madrim in 
March of 2003.48 Instead of being concerned with robbing the ship, 
attackers took turns steering the ship down the congested Malacca 
Strait.49 The incident seemed like a practice run for a terrorist attack 
by the Free Aceh Movement, an Indonesian separationist 
organization.50  
Southeast Asia has become the new “hot-spot” for maritime 
terrorism with three primary terrorist organizations: Abu Sayyaf, 
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, and Jemaah Islamiyah.51 Historical and 
financial ties link al-Qaeda to Abu Sayyaf.52 The region’s extensive 
involvement in world trade makes terrorist activity especially 
dangerous to the global economy.53 While the motives of piracy may 
be different for Somali pirates and maritime terrorists, the 
international community must prevent both groups from committing 
acts of violence at sea.  
III. Sole Reliance on Navies to Prevent Piracy is 
Inadequate 
Navies around the world actively work to prevent and deter 
piracy in the 2.5 million square miles of pirate-ridden waters.54 By 
2013, three anti-piracy patrols and approximately thirty navies 
worked together to thwart pirate attacks.55 The European Union 
Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) began operations in December 2008 and 
46. See Katherine Zimmerman, Ten Years After 9/11: Al Qaeda’s 
Reemergence in Yemen, CRITICAL THREATS PROJ.: AM. ENTERPRISE 
INST. (Sept. 20, 1011), http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/zimmerma 
n-qaeda-reemergence-september-20-2011. The bombing of the USS Cole 
off the coast of Yemen killed seventeen Americans. Id. 
47. Sebastian Rotella & Esther Schrader, Tanker Blast Likely a Terror 
Attack, French Say, LA TIMES, Oct. 11, 2002, http://articles.latimes. 
com/2002/oct/11/world/fg-tanker11. A small boat rammed the side of 
the French oil tanker off the coast of Yemen. Id. 
48. See Burnett, supra note 42. 
49. See id. 
50. See id. 
51. See Rommel C. Banlaoi, Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The 
Abu Sayyaf Threat, NAVAL WAR COLL. REV., Autumn 2005, at 63. 
52. See id. at 65. 
53. See id. at 64. Four of the largest trade routes go through Southeast Asia 
and the value of trade through the area is on the rise. Id.  
54. About CMF, COMBINED MARITIME FORCES, http://combinedmaritime 
orces.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
55. Id.  
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operates under the European Common Security and Defense Policy.56 
The EU NAVFOR conducts Operation ATALANTA, which includes 
deterrence, prevention, and repression of pirate activities.57 It protects 
vessels in the World Food Programme and the African Union Mission 
in Somali shipping routes.58 Operation ATALANTA also assists in 
monitoring fishing activities off the coast of Somalia.59 Currently, the 
EU NAVFOR consists of approximately 1,500 military personnel 
operating navy vessels, maritime patrol, reconnaissance aircrafts, and 
vessel protection detachment teams, in addition to their land-based 
personnel.60 The force patrols about 2 million nautical miles.61  
The multinational naval force, Combined Task Force 150, also 
assists in piracy patrols.62 The force was created at the beginning of 
Operation Enduring Freedom63 and is tasked with counterterrorism 
missions.64 It now works to provide a stable and prosperous maritime 
environment in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Red 
Sea, and Indian Ocean.65 France, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, Pakistan, Canada, and Australia have taken part in 
commanding Combined Task Force 150.66 
Combined Task Force 151 began in January 2009 as a counter-
piracy force established so the U.S. Navy could work with non-
western navies.67 The Task Force first started as a partnership 
between the United States, Korean, and Turkish navies68 and is now 
comprised of personnel from numerous coalition countries,69 such as 
56. See Mission, EU NAVFOR SOMALIA, http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-
us/mission/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).  
57. Id. 
58. See id.  
59. See id. (noting that it only assists shipping on a case-by-case basis).  
60. See id.  
61. See id.  
62. See Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, COMBINED MARITIME FORCES, 
http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/cmf/150/index.html (last visited Mar. 9, 
2013). 
63. See id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. See Combined Task Force 151, COMBINED MARITIME FORCES, 
http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/cmf/151/index.html (last visited Mar. 9, 
2013). 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
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Pakistan and Denmark.70 The Task Force operates counter-piracy 
missions in approximately 1.1 million square miles in the Gulf of Aden 
and off the eastern coast of Somalia.71 China is one eastern nation 
that does not work with this coalition force.72 Rather, China primarily 
focuses on protecting its own ships by sending armed convoy escorts.73  
The success of the international navy response is difficult to 
measure because even though patrols have reduced the number of 
successful attacks, pirates have increased their attempted attacks.74 
Pirates are becoming more successful with the enlistment of modern 
technology, such as satellite phones and GPS devices, along with the 
use of previously hijacked ships used as “mother ships.”75 Localized 
successes in the Gulf of Aden have pushed pirates to expand their 
attack zone outside of the navies’ reach.76 This success would 
disappear if navies leave the area or spread themselves too thin.77 
Additionally, navies cannot prevent pirate attacks occurring in 
territorial waters where international law prevents them from 
asserting jurisdiction.78    
70. Denmark Assumes Command of Combined Task Force 151 Bahrain, 
COMBINED MARITIME FORCES (Jan. 12, 2012), http://combinedmaritime 
forces.com/2012/01/12/denmark-assumes-command-of-combined-task-
force-151-bahrain/. 
71. See Combined Task Force 151, supra note 67. 
72. See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, United States Navy (Nov. 14, 
2011).  
73. James Warden, Combined Task Force 151 Hunts Down Pirates in the 
Gulf of Aden, STARS AND STRIPES (Mar. 29, 2009), http://www. 
stripes.com/news/combined-task-force-151-hunts-down-pirates-in-the-
gulf-of-aden-1.89695. In 2010, China expanded their anti-piracy efforts 
and joined forces with the United States, NATO, and the United 
Nations. See China’s Anti-Piracy Role off Somalia Expands, BBC, Jan. 
29, 2010 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8486502.stm; see also Mission, 
supra note 56.  
74. See Christopher Alessi, Combating Maritime Piracy, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/france/combating-
maritime-piracy/p18376 (noting that even if the increase in patrols 
reduce the number of attack, piracy is still on the rise).  
75. See Bento, supra note 20, at 406.  
76. See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72. LCDR Berube 
described the effect of the navies’ efforts in one area to the air in a 
balloon being pushed. It does not go away; it will simply move to 
another area. Id. 
77. See Alessi, supra note 74 (explaining how even though the patrols are 
effective, they are treating the symptoms and not the root cause of the 
problems, the instability in Somalia). 
78. See George D. Gabal, Jr., Smoother Seas Ahead: Draft Guidelines as an 
Intentional Solution to Modern-Day Piracy, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1433, 1442 
(2007) (discussing how UNCLOS does not apply in territorial waters). 
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While navy efforts have helped prevent successful pirate attacks, 
navies are better equipped to fight war, not crime.79 Long-standing 
naval tradition focuses on conflict between countries.80 Navies are not 
equipped to protect every ship traversing the high seas. Moreover, 
countries often reject naval escorts through pirate-infested waters 
because the cost to a navy is too high.81 With a limited resources, 
funding, and personnel, navies cannot defeat piracy on their own.82  
IV. Free Market Solutions, Such as Armed Guards to 
Protect Ships, Should Be Allowed to Assist Navies by 
Serving as Deterrents Against Piracy 
Limited capabilities and resources restrict countries’ abilities to 
use navies to enforce security measures against piracy.83 The navies’ 
inability to be omnipresent and protect all ships traveling through 
pirate-infested waters opens up a lucrative market for private security 
companies.84 Private security options can alleviate the high costs that 
piracy creates for governments and shipping companies.85 With 
private security measures, the cost of lost goods and ransoms 
79. See Peter Andreas & Richard Price, From War Fighting to Crime 
Fighting: Transforming the American National Security State, INT’L 
STUD. REV., Fall 2001, at 31, 32 (discussing how the militaries have 
traditionally focused on countries in war fights); Colonel Robert B. 
Killebrew, Crime and War, U.S. NAVAL INST. (Oct. 2011), 
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-10/crime-and-war 
(noting the military’s most important change right now is shifting their 
focus to fight “crime, terrorism, and insurgency”). 
80. See Andreas & Price, supra note 79, at 31, 32; Killebrew, supra note 79. 
81. See, e.g., Catherine Bolsover, Germany is Close to Deploying 
‘Mercenaries’ to Protect Ships from Pirates, DW (Aug. 18, 2011), 
http://www.dw.de/germany-is-close-to-deploying-mercenaries-to-
protect-ships-from-pirates/a-15325923-1. 
82. See Ron Paul: Responses to Piracy, YOUTUBE (Apr. 21, 2009), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Da15g61L1Wk.  
83. See Richard, supra note 35, at 417 (discussing the demands of private 
security to assist the government); see also Daniel Straub, Outsourcing 
Human Security: Private Security Companies and Peacekeeping 15 
(APSA Annual Meeting Paper, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1902525 (noting that the United 
Nations, countries acting individually, or countries acting collectively 
cannot solve all the world’s problems). 
84. See Andrew J. Shapiro, Ass’t Sec’y, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 
Remarks to the Defense Trade Advisory Group (Nov. 9, 2011), available 
at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/176925.htm. 
85. See Richard, supra note 35, at 417. The shipping industry suffers from 
high insurance premiums, costly delays and diversions, and extortionate 
ransom demands. Id.   
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disappears and insurance rates decrease, sometimes up to 40%.86 The 
U.S. Navy encourages ships to take advantage of these proactive 
security measures.87  
Private security measures are effective in combating piracy.88 To 
date, pirates have not successfully taken a ship protected by armed 
security guards.89 With an onboard, armed security team, a ship’s 
crew is protected without using the U.S. Navy’s resources. The 
Maersk Alabama provides a telling example of the success that private 
armed guards have protecting ships.90 In April 2009, the U.S. naval 
destroyer, the USS Bainbridge, came to the rescue of the Maersk 
Alabama after pirates took over the ship.91 At the time, the ship had 
no onboard security team.92 In order to free the ship’s captain, who 
the pirates took hostage in the attack, the Navy Seal snipers killed 
the three captors.93 In November 2009, pirates again attempted to 
attack the Maersk Alabama.94 This time, an onboard security team, 
using small firearms, acoustical devices, and evasive maneuvers, 
fended off the attack.95  
Shipping companies are beginning to understand the importance 
and success of preventative measures and are actively seeking armed 
guards.96 However, armed security guards must follow the regulations 
86. See Katharine Houreld, AP IMPACT: Security Firms Joining Somali 
Piracy Fight, USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/ 
news/world/2008-10-26-2583935117_x.htm (explaining how recently 
insurance rates skyrocketed for ships traveling through pirate infested 
waters, but insurance companies slash rates for ships who hire armed 
guards). 
87. See id. (noting the spokesman for the Baharin-based United States 5th 
Fleet, Lieutenant Nate Christensen, supports the proactive safety 
measures offered by the free market). 
88. See Shapiro, supra note 84 (announcing the United States support for 
the use of armed guards because they have proven to be successful). 
89. Id. 
90. See Maersk Alabama Crew Recalls Pirate Attack, USA TODAY, Apr. 17, 
2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-04-16-piratesN.htm. 
91. See id. 
92. See id. 
93. See id. 
94. See Alan Cowell, Pirates Attack Maersk Alabama Again, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 18, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/world/africa/19pi 
rates.html. 
95. See id. 
96. See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72; see also Gus 
Trompiz, Marine Insurers Backing Armed Guards as Piracy Threat 
Grows, INSURANCE J., Sep. 20, 2011, http://www.insurance 
journal.com/news/international/2011/09/20/216642.htm (noting how 
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of the flagship country, territorial waters, and ports they travel 
through.97 Some countries have begun to change gun laws for both the 
flagships and territorial waters, recognizing the need for laws allowing 
armed guards to utilize the legal defense of self-defense.98 Private 
security firms cannot enhance the navies’ efforts until these legal 
barriers have been dismantled. 
A. Legal Barriers Make It Difficult for Shipping Companies to Hire 
Armed Guards to Protect Ships. 
1. Gun control laws make it difficult for merchant ships to allow 
armed guards to accompany ships.      
Ships are subject to many different laws and regulations that 
hinder their ability to hire armed guards.99 Countries exercise 
jurisdiction over ships that sail under their flag,100 and coastal 
countries exercise jurisdiction over ships that innocently pass through 
their territorial waters,101 which includes coastal countries’ ability to 
exercise limited criminal jurisdiction over ships.102 For example, a 
country may impose criminal liability on a ship’s crewmembers for 
disruption of the peace.103 If a ship is attacked by pirates in a 
country’s territorial waters and a pirate is killed in the squabble, both 
the flag state and the territorial state can exercise criminal 
jurisdiction.104 If just one of these jurisdictions prohibits guns, 
merchant ships will be unable to hire armed guards.        
shipping companies were first reluctance to hire armed guards because 
of potential legal liabilities). 
97. See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 (defines the rights and responsibilities for 
vessels at sea) [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
98. See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72 (noting the 
recent changes in laws).  
99. See The Swedish Club, Piracy & Use of Armed Guards: General 
Overview 3–5 (Members’ Alert, undated), available at http://www. 
swedishclub.com/upload/Loss_Prev_Docs/Piracy/PIRACY_and_USE
_OF_ARMED_GUARDS_-_General_overview.pdf  (explaining that 
ships must comply with different regulations and licensing schemes of 
many different jurisdictions the ship will come into contract with). 
100. UNCLOS, supra note 97, art. 94(1). 
101. Id. art. 17. 
102. Id. art. 27. 
103. See The Swedish Club, supra note 99, at 3–5 (outlining considerations 
and suggestions to be taken into account when deciding if armed guards 
can be on merchant ships). 
104. See id. 
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As countries begin to understand the importance of free market 
private security measures, they are changing laws to enable flagships 
to carry guns for protection against pirates.105 Spain was one of the 
first countries to allow fishing boats to carry heavy weapons.106  
Similarly, the United Kingdom,107 Germany,108 and the United 
States109 have followed suit by making changes to their respective gun 
laws. In addition, the International Chamber of Shipping expressed its 
support for the use of armed guards off the coast of Somalia, 
significantly bolstering support for changing gun laws.110  
Security companies work to define their services within the 
confines of the law. For example, one company uses a helicopter to 
drop a bundle of guns on a ship once the ship reaches international 
waters.111 Before the ship leaves international waters, the crew throws 
the guns overboard.112 Companies adopt this counterintuitive 
approach because it is more economical to toss guns into the sea and 
abide by the law than risk traveling without protection from 
pirates.113  Another company adopted a similar model, but instead of 
105. See infra Appendix A. 
106. See Analia Murias, Heavy Weapons Allowed in Tuna Fishing Vessels in 
the Indian Ocean, FISH INFO. SERVS. (Sept. 28, 2011), http://fis. 
com/fis/worldnews/worldnews.asp?l=e&country=0&special=&monthye
ar=&day=&id=46378&ndb=1&df=0 (noting fishers could previously 
carry 7.62mm weapons on tuna boats but that has now been upped to 
12.70mm weapons). 
107. See Somali Piracy: Armed Guards to Protect UK Ships, BBC, Oct. 30, 
2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15510467 (noting Britain wants to 
make it legal to carry guns only through dangerous waters). 
108. See Bolsover, supra note 81 (saying that Germany is responding to the 
hijackings by legalizing armed guards on ships).  
109. See Shapiro, supra note 84. The Somalia Report first leaked the 
unclassified internal memo from Hillary Clinton that stated the United 
States’ support for armed security guards on commercial vessels. Robert 
Young Pelton, U.S. Goes Public with Support for Hired Guns Against 
Piracy, GCAPTAIN (Nov. 12, 2011), http://gcaptain.com/u-s-public-
support-hired-guns?33792. 
110. See Piracy: Issues Arising From the Use of Armed Guards, INCE & 
CO. (Mar. 1, 2011), http://incelaw.com/misc/Piracy-issues-arising-from-
the-use-of-armed-guards/Piracy-Issues-arising-from-the-use-of-armed-
guards. The Internal Chamber of Shipping Commerce is a trade 
association for the shipping industry and is involved in many 
international bodies including the IMO. See Home, INT’L CHAMBER OF 
SHIPPING, http://www.ics-shipping.org/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
111. See Piracy Panelist, supra note 9. Territorial waters extend 12 nautical 
miles off the baseline of the country at which point the sea becomes 
international waters. UNCLOS, supra note 97, art. 3. 
112. See Piracy Panelist, supra note 9. 
113. See id. 
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throwing the guns overboard it sends ships to retrieve the guns from 
the ship that is leaving international waters and entering territorial 
waters.114  
While both types of companies provide a way for shippers to 
protect themselves, many pirate attacks occur in territorial waters.115 
In order for armed guards to provide the necessary protection against 
pirates, the laws of the coastal and flag countries need to allow 
merchant ships to hire armed guards. Countries need to amend their 
maritime law so ships can be protected in all seas, whether territorial 
or international. Countries can then continue to control safety in 
territorial waters through regulations116 and licensing schemes.117  
2. In order for armed guards to protect against piratical acts, self-
defense must be a viable defense. 
Only a country may use force, not private citizens.118 However, 
when a state is unable to protect its citizens, its “monopoly of force” 
gives way to the private citizen’s ability to protect their own 
property. 119 The military controls force at sea,120 but in the military’s 
absence commercial ships should be able to protect against pirates. In 
order for armed guards to adequately protect ships, the law of self-
defense must be applicable.121 While the IMO recognizes the use of 
firearms by private security guards,122 the applicability of self-defense 
114. See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72.  
115. See Daxecker & Prins, supra note 17, at 5; see also infra Appendix B 
(explaining select countries current regulations regarding armed guards 
in ports and territorial waters). 
116. See Richard, supra note 35, at 454–55 (explain that countries can 
manage the risk of allowing guns on ships by establishing regulations 
and punishments for violations of the regulations). 
117. See The Swedish Club, supra note 99, at 4 (noting that some countries 
already have licensing schemes in place). 
118. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD 
GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 18 (1998). 
119. Id.  
120. See Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, Law Professor, Northwestern 
University (Jan. 15, 2012). 
121. See id. (explaining that in most situations where a armed guard kills a 
pirate, self-defense is not applicable). 
122. See IMO, Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators, and 
Shipmasters on the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security 
Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area, annex, § 3.5, U.N. 
Doc. MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.1 (Sep. 16, 2011) (“[Private Maritime 
Security Companies] should require that their personnel not use firearms 
against persons except in self-defence or defence of others against the 
imminent threat of death or serious injury, or to prevent the 
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is not clear. Many countries have narrow laws that do now allow self-
defense to be applicable for armed security guards.123 For instance, an 
armed guard on a German flagship who kills a pirate trying to take 
over the ship may not be able to successfully argue self-defense.124 
Without self-defense, armed guards will be more apprehensive in using 
an appropriate amount of force to fight off pirates. Armed guards 
must be able to protect ships from being overtaken with the use of an 
appropriate amount of force.  
While international law recognizes a general human right to self-
defense, there is no unified understanding of self-defense.125 The 
International Court of Justice addressed the use of force by state 
actors against another state, but it did not address non-state actors 
on the high seas.126 Armed security guards would not be considered 
state actors, even if a country licenses their security guards.127 A 
licensing scheme is a country’s way of meeting their “duty of due 
diligence” to protect others from potentially dangerous situations and 
is not providing a “convenience” for the country to use unlawful 
force.128  
The UN Charter recognizes a right to self-defense,129 but the 
Human Rights Council advocates for a restriction on the private use 
of firearms, hindering the ability of people to defend themselves.130 
perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to 
life.”) [hereinafter Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners]. 
123. See Bolsover, supra note 81. 
124. See id. 
125. See Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, supra note 120 (explaining that 
in most situations, self-defense would not be applicable); see generally 
David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen, The Human Right of 
Self-Defense, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 43 (2007) (examining the legal status of 
self-defense and international laws for self-defense). 
126. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 146 (June 27) (rejecting “the justification of 
collective self-defence maintained by the United States of America in 
connection with the military and paramilitary activities in and against 
Nicaragua the subject of this case”). 
127. See Douglas Guilfoyle, Shooting Fishermen Mistaken for Pirates: 
Jurisdiction, Immunity and State Responsibility, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 2, 
2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/shooting-fishermen-mistaken-for-pirates-
jurisdiction-immunity-and-state-responsibility/. For example, the United 
States is not responsible if a citizen uses a gun they have a license for 
when they kill a foreign citizen. Id. 
128. See id. 
129. U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence. . . .”). 
130. See UN Human Rights Council, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and 
Prot. of Human Rights, Adoption of the Report on the Fifty-eighth 
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Furthermore, the Council’s opinion is that even the strictest gun laws 
in the United States, such as those in Washington, D.C. and New 
York City, are not sufficient.131 The Council states that “[t]he 
intentional lethal use of small arms may only be made when strictly 
unavoidable in order to protect life.”132 “Strictly unavoidable”133 is a 
very high burden that will be difficult to meet. 
Laws governing self-defense vary greatly from country to 
country134 For example, a woman in China was found not guilty of 
murder and to have acted in self-defense when she chased down and 
ran over robbers with her car.135 On the other hand, the United 
Kingdom is clarifying its self-defense law so that homeowners can use 
force against burglars entering their homes.136 This clarification 
excludes homeowners from using self-defense if the burglar flees from 
their home or if the homeowner was protecting a friend.137 Clearly, the 
actions found to be self-defense by the woman in China would not be 
protected in the United Kingdom.         
The United States is particularly pro-self-defense. The U.S. 
support of self-defense policies is entrenched in the society’s pro-gun 
policies, which started with the Second Amendment.138 Pro-gun 
Session to the Human Rights Council, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/Sub.1/58/L.11/Add.1 (Aug. 24, 2006) (stating that firearms 
themselves can be a human rights violation). 
131. See Kopel,, Gallant & Eisen, supra note 125, at 45. 
132. UN Human Rights Council, supra note 128, ¶ 8 (emphasis added). 
133. See id. 
134. See Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, supra note 120. Professor 
Kontorovich explained the difference between the United States and 
England by saying that if someone has a gun to your head in England 
and demands your wallet, you hand the criminal your wallet. The 
United States does not require handing over the wallet. Id.  
135. See Li Shigong, Are There Limits to Self—Defense?, 
BEIJINGREVIEW.COM (Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.bjreview.com.cn/for 
um/txt/2009-04/28/content_ 193066.htm (reporting how the court 
found that after the two men had stolen the women’s purse containing 
the equivalent of U.S. $11,720, the woman was justified in claiming self-
defense because the men’s flight was a part of the robbery).  
136. See Right to Self-Defense in Homes to be “Much Clearer,” BBC, June 
29, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13957587 (noting that 
even though England recognizes self-defenses as a defense at common 
law, previous doubt in the self-dense laws in the context of protecting 
one’s home must be clarified through legislative action).  
137. See id. 
138. See U.S. CONST. amend. II (“[T]he right of the people to keep and bear 
arms shall not be infringed.”). See also Sam Bateman, Riding Shotgun: 
Armed Security Guards Onboard Merchant Ships 1 (S. Rajaratnam 
School of International Studies Commentary, Mar. 5, 2010), available at 
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0282010.pdf 
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policies are still especially popular.139 In the United States, citizens 
enjoy a broadly protected right to self-defense.140 The Model Penal 
Code, which has greatly influenced criminal law in most jurisdictions 
in the United States,141 describes self-defense as “the use of force upon 
or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that 
such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting 
himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the 
present occasion.”142  
Without well-defined, unified self-defense laws, armed guards will 
have a more difficult time protecting against pirates. The guards will 
either not understand when they can and cannot use force,143 or, 
because of the lack applicable self-defense laws, they will be unable to 
protect the ships. Just as countries need to change their laws to be 
more open to allowing guns on their flag-ships and in their ports, self-
defense laws must change as well.   
(noting that the United States’ history of pro-gun rights resulted from 
the frontier and revolutionary era in America). 
139. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (deciding 
that an individuals have the right to bear arms and this right is 
unconnected to the militia service). See also Bateman, supra note 138, 
at 1 (noting that the United States’ history of pro-gun rights is still 
defended even with the United States high rate of gun violence). But see 
About Us, BRADY CAMPAIGN, http://www.bradycampaign.org/about/ 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2013) (arguing that citizens have a “right to live 
free from the threat of gun violence” and advocating for more gun 
regulation).  
140. See, e.g., State v. Singleton, 974 A.2d 679, 688–89 (Conn. 2009) (noting 
that the defendant must only meet the burden of production with 
regards to self-defense; then the state then must disprove self-defense 
beyond a reasonable doubt); McEwen v. State, 695 N.E.2d 79, 90 (Ind. 
1998) (finding that when the defense present supporting evidence for a 
claim of self-defense, the state must negate one of the necessary 
elements of self-defense).        
141. Paul H. Robinson & Markus Dirk Dubber, An Introduction to the 
Model Penal Code 5–8 (Mar. 12, 1999), available at http:// 
www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/intromodpencode.pdf (explaining the 
influence of the Model Penal Code on the different States’ criminal 
systems). 
142. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1985). While the Model Penal Code does 
not serve as the law of any jurisdiction, it influences and guides 
legislatures in enacting their own jurisdictions laws. KATE E. BLOCH & 
KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL, CRIMINAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 7 
(2005). 
143. This can depend on the laws of their flagship or the laws of the 
territorial waters they have entered as discussed in supra part III. 
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B. A Collective International Response Must Support the Free Market 
Assistance of Private Security Companies and Armed Guards.  
In order for armed guards to protect merchant nations should 
adopt a collective approach in outlining regulations under which ships 
desiring to hire armed security guards should operate.144 With private 
security companies from one country on a ship flagged in another 
country and a crew from a third, shipping companies and private 
security companies struggle to keep up with all applicable 
regulations. 145 A unified standard will help ships travelling to several 
ports on the same trip to ensure compliance with all regulations.146  
Without a unified standard, the assistance of private security 
companies will be more difficult. There are two important collective 
responses necessary for these advances in maritime security. First, the 
United Nations must affirm support for shipping companies to employ 
armed guards and create guidelines for such employment. Second, 
navies must improve communication with shipping companies in an 
effort to defuse piracy more quickly and protect the world economy.  
1. The United Nations must affirmatively support a ship’s choice to 
utilize the security companies and armed guards to protect against 
pirates. 
As a specialized agency of the United Nations, the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO)147 is in the best position to create 
cohesive standards so private security companies can more easily 
provide merchant ships with armed security guards.148 The Geneva 
144. See Bento, supra note 20, at 415 (noting that the high sea is owned 
collectively by counties and thus a collective response is most 
appropriate). See also Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, supra note 
120 (discussing how it would be helpful to have international 
guidelines). 
145. See JOHN S. BURNETT, DANGEROUS WATERS: MODERN PIRACY AND 
TERROR ON THE HIGH SEAS 160 (2003) (referring to a “typical case” 
being one where “[a] ship built in Japan, owned by a brass-plate 
company in Malta, controlled by an Italian, managed by a company in 
Cyprus, chartered by the French, skippered by a Norwegian, crewed by 
Indians, registered in Panama, financed by a British bank, carrying a 
cargo owned by a multinational oil company, is attacked while 
transiting an international waterway in Indonesian territory and 
arrested in the Philippines”). 
146. See Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, supra note 120 (discussing how 
it would be helpful to have international guidelines). 
147. Introduction to the IMO, INT’L MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo 
.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
148. See Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, supra note 120 (discussing the 
IMO’s ability to be the organizational body to provide unified 
standards). 
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Convention established the IMO in 1948 to promote maritime 
safety.149 Currently, the IMO has 170 members and three associate 
members, seventy-eight international non-governmental organizations 
in consultative status, and sixty-three intergovernmental 
organizations with agreements of co-operation.150 The IMO boasts 
that the “best way of improving safety at sea is by developing 
international regulations.”151 Additionally, the organization is already 
involved in piracy prevention.152  
The IMO does not presently support armed guards on ships, but 
it does provide some guidelines for ships that are considering or that 
have hired private security companies and armed guards.153 The IMO 
has written guidelines for ship owners,154 flagships countries,155 and for 
port and coastal countries.156 The guidelines for ship owners regarding 
security companies are the most extensive of the three drafted 
guidelines.157 Some of the guidelines include performing a risk analysis, 
researching security companies, requesting documents from potential 
private security companies, and analyzing insurance policies, along 
149. History of IMO, INT’L MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo.org/About 
/HistoryOfIMO/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
150. Membership, INT’L MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo.org/About/Membe 
rship/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
151. History of IMO, supra note 140. 
152. Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo. 
org/About/Pages/FAQs.aspx#18 (last visited Mar. 9, 2013) (answering 
the question “What is the IMO doing about piracy?”). 
153. See Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, supra note 122, annex ¶ 1 
(explaining that because shipping companies may not find reliable 
private security companies, the IMO will not endorse their use but their 
popularity necessities the IMO’s guidelines).  
154. See id. annex (outlining guidelines for shipping companies to take when 
decided to hire private security companies to provide armed guards).  
155. See generally IMO, Revised Interim Recommendations for Flag States 
Regarding the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on 
Board Ships in the High Risk Area, IMO Doc. MSC.1/Circ.1406/Rev.1 
(Sept. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Revised Interim Recommendations for Flag 
States] (noting that flag countries also need to address the use of armed 
guards on their ships). 
156. See generally IMO, Interim Recommendations for Port and Coastal 
States Regarding the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security 
Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area, IMO. Doc. 
MSC.1/Circ.1408 (Sept. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Interim 
Recommendations for Port and Coastal States] (outlining the 
regulations coastal countries need to address because of the movement 
towards armed security guards).  
157. See id.; Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, supra note 122, 
annex; Revised Interim Recommendations for Flag States, supra note 
155, annex. 
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with other general precautionary evaluations before they decide to 
hire armed security guards.158  
The IMO guidelines for port and coastal countries are very 
general.159 While the IMO recognizes the need for states to have 
embarkment, disembarkment, and vessel calling requirements, it has 
not suggested a unified international standard.160 For instance, a 
merchant ship traveling to numerous countries will have to conduct 
extensive research to ensure compliance with each individual 
country’s regulations. One small mistake could lead to a very costly 
arms law violation.161   
The IMO’s recommendations for flag countries do not address any 
particular laws regarding guns on flagships.162 The recommendation 
only says that the ship’s owners need to be aware of flag countries 
laws and that the flag countries need to address whether the ships can 
have armed guards on their ships.163 The recommendation warns flag 
countries about the escalation of violence in an encounter with pirates 
as a result of having guns on the ships.164 However, this is a concern 
based on an inaccurate comparison of the private armed guards with 
the private security guards in Iraq and Afghanistan.165  
Even though the member states of the IMO are reluctant to 
endorse a ship’s employment of armed guards,166 the organization 
should support the shipping companies’ ability to choose to hire 
158. See generally Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, supra note 122, 
annex (outlining guidelines for merchant shipping companies considering 
private security companies with armed guards to take). 
159. See Interim Recommendations for Port and Coastal States, supra note 
156, annex (outlining only what countries should address, not any 
specifics about how to address them or recommendations on what the 
regulations should be). 
160. See id. (failing to provide any specifics about how to address issues or 
recommendations on what the regulations should be). 
161. For example, yachtsman Chris Packer was charged with gun running in 
Indonesia for having guns to protect against pirates. See Velleco, supra 
note 5. 
162. See Revised Interim Recommendations for Flag States, supra note 155, 
annex § 1. 
163. See id. annex §§ 2, 4–5. 
164. See id. annex § 3(encouraging the countries to account the possibility of 
violence escalating because of guns on ships). 
165. See infra part IV(C).  
166. See Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, supra note 155, annex § 
1(explaining that because shipping companies may not find reliable 
private security companies, the IMO will not endorse their use).  
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armed guards.167 The best approach for the IMO is to consider 
regulations by consulting those that the regulations will affect.168 For 
example, it is important for companies that operate ships to be able 
to weigh in on what is feasible, for the security companies to attest to 
the strengths and weaknesses of the security teams, and for the 
coastal countries to express concerns about gun safety. The IMO 
should start this process with the Maritime Safety Committee, which 
has started to address piracy.169 With the help of the committee’s 
research and recommendations, the IMO member states can support 
unified regulations and adopt these regulations.170 With unified 
regulations in place, shipping companies will be able to more carefully 
and efficiently ensure compliance with all laws and regulations 
applicable to the merchant ships they have been hired to protect ships 
in transit through dangerous, pirate-rich waters.      
2. The individual state navies and the coalition navies must utilize 
assistance from security companies.  
Worldwide, navies cannot adequately protect merchant ships from 
piracy,171 but the more ships the navies have, the more “eyes” they 
have on the water, and the more effectively they can combat piracy.172 
When security companies employ armed guards to traverse waters, 
the companies also monitor pirate activity. Right now, navies under-
utilize the knowledge security companies can provide.173 With navies 
and security companies working together, the navies’ ability to 
pinpoint pirates will be greatly increased and the efforts to defeat 
piracy can become more effective. 
167. See Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, supra note 120 (addressing the 
fact that some shipping companies do not want armed security guards 
on their ships).  
168. See id. (explaining that the shipping companies should be involved in 
the creation of regulations). 
169. See Structure of the IMO, INT’L MARITIME ORG., http://www 
.imo.org/About/Pages/Structure.aspx#3 (last visited Mar. 9. 2013) 
(listing the different IMO committees); see also Revised Interim 
Recommendations for Flag States, supra note 155, annex § 3 (noting the 
Maritime Safety Committee’s involvement in creating the 
recommendations). 
170. The IMO could adopt these regulations through a number of means 
including a convention or an amendment to a convention. See 
Conventions, INT’L MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo.org/About/Conven 
tions/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
171. See supra Part III. 
172. See Houreld, supra note 86 (explaining the support for private security 
companies in joining the fight against piracy). 
173. See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72.  
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The U.S. Department of Justice created a report addressing a 
partnership between law enforcement and private security.174 Even 
though this report was intended to assist in collaboration for 
community security efforts, 175 the analysis can easily be transferred to 
the efforts between the navies and private security companies 
combating piracy. The report outlines five important steps needed to 
enhance this partnership: 1) improve the communication process; 2) 
improve the content of the communication; 3) improve training 
content; 4) facilitate personal contacts among the membership; and 5) 
find out what other law enforcement-private security partnerships are 
doing.176 These steps identify how navies and private security 
companies can create their own partnership to protect the high seas 
from the terror of piracy.  
C. Criticism Falls Short 
1. Allowing armed guards on ships will not lead to more shooting. 
Critics worry that armed security guards will create a “Wild 
West” at sea.177 Pirates already come aboard with “guns blazing,” in 
order to stop the ship and board it more easily.178 Critics say that if 
security guards resemble the “trigger-happy” security members in Iraq 
and Afghanistan who do not understand the “rules of engagement,” 
then they will quickly fire back at the pirates.179 The exchange will 
result in a quickly-escalated, deadly exchange of gunfire.180  
This argument fails for two reasons. First, critics cannot 
adequately compare the troubles of the security companies’ “trigger-
174. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE LAW ENFORCEMENT-PRIVATE 
SECURITY CONSORTIUM, OPERATION PARTNERSHIPS: TRENDS AND 
PRACTICES IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURITY 
COLLABORATIONS (2009) (analyzing the work of law enforcement and 
private security companies so that they might work together to ensure 
community safety). 
175. See id. at 5 (explaining the purpose of the report). 
176. See id. at 116 (creating these steps based on the exercise of law 
enforcement officers and private security contractors after conducting 
studies, focus groups, and interviews). 
177. See Houreld, supra note 86. 
178. See id. (explaining how pirates fire at the bridge of the ship in order to 
get the ship to slow down or stop so that the pirates can board it). 
179. See id. (referring to the security companies in Iraq and Afghanistan 
blaming their operators for its negative reputation). 
180. See Most Ship Owners Still Reluctant to Arm Crews, MSNBC (Apr. 9, 
2009),jhttp://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30141951/ns/world_news-
africa/t/most-ship-owners-still-reluctant-arm-crews/#.TqC3Ut4Uqso.  
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happy” armed guards in Iraq and Afghanistan181 with the security 
guards on merchant ships. While the security companies in the 
Middle East have quasi-governmental control and act as soldiers, the 
guards on merchant ships act as watchmen.182 This is a much safer, 
lower-intensity job.183 Private armed security guards create an 
intimidating presence, which deters pirate activity, much like the 
effect of a private security guard at a bank or jewelry store.184     
The armed security guards on merchant ships are not at war with 
pirates.185 Despite the classic view of pirates as hostis humani generis 
(an enemy of human kind), pirates more closely resemble criminals 
than combatants.186 Pirates generally rob, pillage, and hold hostages 
for ransom for economic gain.187 If the laws of war applied, pirates 
would either have to be treated as combatants, which would 
legitimatize lethal force, or as civilians which would hinder actions to 
defeat piracy.188 The rules of engagement do not appropriately address 
the laws governing the use of force in these incidences.189   
Second, the weapons carried by armed guards present problems.190 
Armed guards are often only given shotguns in order to comply with 
the laws of the flagship and the ports.191 Shotguns are no match for 
the pirates’ long-range heavy weaponry that can fire 600 rounds per 
minute.192 By equipping armed guards with the right weapons, the 
181. See Houreld, supra note 86 (referring to the security companies in Iraq 
and Afghanistan blaming their operators for its negative reputation). 
182. See Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, supra note 120 (explaining how 
the operations of a security company in Iraq and Afghanistan do not 
resemble the security companies operation on a merchant ship at sea). 
183. See id. 
184. See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72.  
185. See Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, supra note 120 (explaining how 
the operations of a security company in Iraq and Afghanistan do not 
resemble the security companies operation on a merchant ship at sea). 
186. See Guilfoyle, supra note 127 (explaining the difference between 
describing pirates as combatants and describing pirates as criminals). 
187. See Daxecker & Prins, supra note 17, at 9–12 (explaining the economic 
gains of piracy).  
188. See Guilfoyle, supra note 127 (noting the harms of treating pirates as 
combatants). 
189. See Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, supra note 120 (saying that 
“rules of engagement” is not correct because this is not a time of war). 
190. See Most Ship Owners Still Reluctant to Arm Crews, supra note 180 
(noting that the guns that comply with laws in different ports are 
generally short range and traditionally used for bird control). 
191. See id. 
192. See id. 
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armed guards will deter pirates from attacking the ship.193 When 
pirates see armed guards onboard ships, they will pass by and look for 
an easier victim.194   
In order to further address the critics’ fears, government 
regulations can mitigate the risk of unwarranted violence.195 For 
example, regulations about the appropriate use of force must be 
agreed upon and put in place by an organization such as the IMO. 
These regulations could provide for both simulated and classroom 
training. Upon completion of such training, a regulatory board could 
issue the armed guard with a license to serve as security on a 
merchant ship. With unified regulatory measures in place, armed 
guards will be able to serve as watchmen and protectors of merchant 
ships, fending off piracy with the appropriate amount of force.  
2. Ports will not be more dangerous if armed guards carrying guns are 
allowed into ports.  
Governments are concerned about the loyalty of foreign private 
security personnel in territorial waters and ports.196 Some in the 
international community fear another Captain Kidd and the 
Adventure Galley incident in which a private contractor hired to 
combat piracy decided to turn to piracy himself.197 Captain Kidd stole 
the ship and equipment provided to him by the state and resorted to 
the very career he was hired to defeat.198  
Academics have confidence that security personnel will remain 
loyal.199 In this modern era, security companies boast professionalism 
193. See Velleco, supra note 5; Interview with Michael Newton, Law 
Professor, Vanderbilt University, in Cleveland, OH (Nov. 11, 2011) 
(noting how “‘gun-free zones’ simply make easy targets for criminals”). 
194. See, e.g., Live Piracy Report: Armed Guards Thwart Attack Attempt, 
NEPTUNE MARITIME SECURITY (Jan. 24, 2012), http://neptunemaritime 
security.posterous.com/live-piracy-report-armed-guards-thwart-attack-
8200. 
195. See Richard, supra note 35, at 454–55 (explaining how governments 
could put in place regulatory controls that the security companies must 
follow, and if these regulations are not followed, the government would 
impose consequences). 
196. See Gordon Corera, Analysis: Somali Piracy: Armed Guards to Protect 
UK Ships, BBC, Oct. 30, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
15510467. 
197. See Richard, supra note 35, at 412–13. In 1696, the Adventure Galley, a 
merchant ship, was fitted with guns and weapons to hunt down pirates. 
After being unsuccessful, Captain Kidd resorted to piracy. Id. 
198. See id.  
199. See Interview with Michael Newton, supra note 193; Interview with 
LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72.  
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and maritime skills.200 Countries can protect their interests by 
requiring security guards to obtain licenses and pay licensing fees.201 
For example, Djibouti requires security companies to obtain 
licenses.202 Countries can also put other regulations in place such as 
requiring ships to place guns in a  locker when a ship pulls into 
port.203 Officials from the port country can then check and secure the 
lockers once the ship has arrived in port.204  
3. Armed guards are not mercenaries. 
Some critics feel hired armed guards on merchant ships qualify as 
mercenaries under international law, but this is untrue. Article 47 of 
the Geneva Convention defines a mercenary as a person who is 
recruited to fight in armed conflict that does not belong to a party of 
the conflict or the forces of that party, has not been sent by the state, 
and is motivated by private gain to fight.205 Critics object to armed 
200. The International Association for Maritime Security Professionals 
provides a code of practice and a Constitution for the Industry. See 
Membership Criteria, INT’L ASSOC. FOR MARITIME SECURITY 
PROFESSIONALS,jhttp://iamsponline.org/membership/membership-
criteria/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). With the current world trend to 
downsize militaries, security companies hire former Marines who bring 
professionalism and maritime security knowledge from their previously 
serves in the military. See Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, supra 
note 120. 
201. See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72.  
202. See id. (noting one country that already requires licensing). Criticism 
emerged when rumors circulated that Djibouti licensed the troubled 
security company Blackwater. See, e.g., Simon, Blackwater Counter-
Piracy in Djibouti, CROWDLEAKS, http://crowdleaks.org/blackwater-
counter-piracy-in-djibouti/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2011). However, 
through two name changes and management turnover, the security 
company bears little resemblance to the troubled company operating in 
Iraq. Nathan Hodge, Company Once Known as Blackwater Ditches Xe 
for Yet Another New Name, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204319004577089021757
803802.html. 
203. See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72 (providing 
other suggestions to ease countries’ anxiety about armed guards within 
their ports).  
204. See id.  
205. See Geneva Convention on the High Seas, art. 47(2), Apr. 29, 2958, 450 
U.N.T.S. 82. Article 47 provides: 
 A mercenary is any person who:  
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an 
armed conflict;  
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;  
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the 
desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf 
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guards on merchant ships, claiming that armed security guards act as 
mercenaries and that the function of using lethal force belongs to the 
state alone.206  
Armed guards act as peacekeepers by deterring hostilities through 
their intimidating presence. Private actors serving in a peacekeeping 
role do not act for the state.207 For instance, companies regularly hire 
private guards to protect banks, museums, hospitals, and other 
entities.208 U.S. courts deem private police for these entities as state 
actors when they have been entrusted with complete police 
authority.209 But when complete police power is not transferred to the 
private police officer, courts hold the private police officer does not 
act as a public actor.210 For example, the Chicago Housing Authority 
hired a security guard in Wade v. Byles to provide security services to 
the residents of an apartment building.211 The guard was authorized 
to carry a handgun and use it in self-defense, but if trouble arose in 
the lobby, the security guard was required to call the police.212 The 
security guard was not authorized to leave the lobby area in pursuit 
of anyone.213 The limited scope of the security guard’s authority 
precluded him from being deemed a state actor.214   
Courts also note the legitimacy of a private security team’s 
authority under the “shopkeepers privilege.”215  Individuals have a 
of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in 
excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks 
and functions in the armed forces of that Party;  
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident 
of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict; 
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the 
conflict; and 
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the 
conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces. 
 Id.  
206. See, e.g., Bolsover, supra note 81 (noting the objection to armed guards 
on merchant ships by the German Free Democrats Party).  
207. Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Rendell-Baker 
v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982)) (“The simple fact that a private 
entity performs a function that serves the public does not transform its 
conduct into state action.”).  
208. See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72.  
209. Romanski v. Detroit Entm’t, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 2005). 
210. Id. 
211. Wade, 83 F.3d at 903. 
212. Id. at 904. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. at 906. 
215. Romanski v. Detroit Entm’t, L.L.C., 28 F.3d 629, 638 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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right to protect personal property and are motivated to do so by self-
interest.216 “A storekeeper’s central motivation in detaining a person 
whom he believes to be in the act of stealing his property is self-
protection, not altruism.”217 This self-interested act cannot be 
attributed to the state action.218  
Unlike mercenaries who are recruited to fight offensively, armed 
security guards are recruited to protect using defensive measures.219 
Armed security guards do not engage pirates in war; they are 
protecting ships from criminals.220 Armed security guards should be 
entrusted with limited powers like the armed guard in Wade v. Byles 
whose scope of protection was limited to the lobby.221 The armed 
guards should be limited to protecting ships, and if hostilities arise, 
then the armed guards should be required to call the proper 
protective authority—a country’s navy.222 Without full authority as a 
state actor, the private security guards do not qualify as 
mercenaries.223  
V. Conclusion 
With a global economy that is highly dependent on the shipping 
industry, piracy is a very serious problem in modern society.224 The 
world’s navies must continue efforts to protect against piracy. The 
absence of a naval presence would cause an even greater resurgence of 
pirate activity.225 Piracy cannot be stopped by the efforts of navies 
alone. The free market must be permitted to provide assistance.  
Armed security guards can be an effective addition to navies in 
achieving a solution to the piracy problem. Before this can happen 
legal obstacles must be dismantled. The most appropriate and 
effective way to do this is through a collaborative world effort. The 
IMO’s authority in maritime safety makes it the perfect organization 
216. See Chapman v. Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825, 834 (6th Cir. 2003). 
217. Id. (quoting White v. Scrivner Corp., 594 F.2d 140, 142 (5th Cir. 1979)) 
(finding a Dillard’s security officer did not act as a state actor when he 
stopped a customer suspected of shoplifting). 
218. Id. 
219. See Richard, supra note 35, at 461. 
220. See id. at 462. 
221. See Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902, 904 (7th Cir. 1996). 
222. See id. (noting the security guards duty to call the police when a person 
refused to leave the lobby of the residence). 
223. See Richard, supra note 35, at 459. 
224. See Daxecker & Prins, supra note 17, at 5 (noting that pirates create 
devastating, worldwide impacts). 
225. See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72.  
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to initiate this effort.226 With assistance from costal states, shipping 
companies, flagship states, and security companies, the IMO’s 
Maritime Safety Committee can create a set of guidelines to enable 
merchant ships to hire armed security guards. These guidelines can 
include protective measures such as licensing schemes and shipping 
port regulations to ease critics’ fears about the potential dangers of 
allowing armed security guards on merchant ships.227 The guidelines 
can then be adopted by the member states of the IMO and 
implemented by each member country.228 The implementation of these 
regulations will equip armed security guards to assist the navies’ 
efforts. With these unified legal changes, ships that were previously 
attacked, like the Maersk Alabama, will be able to utilize armed 
security guards to deter and fend off pirates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
226. See History of IMO, supra note 149 (noting its involvement in 
promoting safety at sea). 
227. The IMO has already developed regulations including the Djibouti Code 
of Conduct in its efforts against piracy. See Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships, INT’L MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo.org/Media 
Centre/resources/Pages/Piracy-and-armed-robbery-against-ships.aspx 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2013). The regulations developed by the IMO 
regarding armed guards could resemble the adoption of the Djibouti 
Meeting or be an addition to the Djibouti Code of Conduct. See 
generally Djibouti Code of Conduct, INT;L MARITIME ORG., 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/Pages/DCoC.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2013). The regulations can also offer guidelines for 
licensing schemes for private security companies, simulated and 
classroom training for armed guards, and regulations for firearms in 
ports.  
228. See IMO Member States, INT’L MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo.org 
/About/Membership/Pages/MemberStates.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 
2013) (listing the IMO member states). 
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Appendix A: Regulations Regarding Armed Security 
Guards’ Flagship Country 
Country Can Flagships Have 
Armed Security Guards? 
Egypt Yes229 
Germany  Yes230 
Greece Yes231 
Italy Yes232 
Japan  No233 
Liberia Yes234 
Marshall Islands Yes235 
Netherlands No236 
Panama Yes237 
South Africa Yes238 
United Kingdom Yes239 
United States Yes240 
Yemen No241 
229. Piracy: Somalia and the Gulf of Aden–Updates, NORTH (Nov. 21, 2011) 
http://www.nepia.com/publications/industrynews/ships/africa/795/. 
230. See Bolsover, supra note 81. 
231. Greece Will Allow Armed Guards on Ships to Protect from Pirates, 
DEFENCEWEB (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php? 
option=com_content&view=article&id=21594:greece-will-allow-armed-
guards-on-ships-to-protect-from-pirates&catid=51:Sea&Itemid=106. 
232. Somali Piracy: 2011 Annual Update, STRATFOR GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE 
(Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/somali-piracy-2011-
annual-update (allowing ships to rent military when they travel through 
Somali pirate waters). 
233. Id. 
234. Id.  
235. Id.  
236. Id. 
237. Id.  
238. Somali Piracy: Somalia and the Gulf of Aden–Updates, supra note 226. 
239. Somali Piracy: 2011 Annual Update, supra note 232 (allowing armed 
guards in the Somali pirate region). 
240. See Shapiro, supra note 84 (announcing support for armed security 
guards for the protection against pirates). 
241. Yemen Bans Armed Guards on Ships, ALSAHWA-YEMEN (Jan. 19, 2012), 
http://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/arabic/subjects/5/2012/1/ 
19/15472.htm. 
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APPENDIX B: REGULATIONS REGARDING THE ABILITY OF 
ARMED SECURITY GUARDS TO ENTER TERRITORIAL 
WATERS AND PORTS242 
Country Port Regulations Territorial Water Regulations 
Australia  
• Requires notification 
regarding: 
- when a ship intends 
to enter or depart 
from port; 
- the flag country’s 
authorization of 
firearms; 
- information on the 
firearms onboard; 
and 
- information about 
the armed guards, 
for example the 
armed guards must 
have the 
appropriate visa. 
• To embark or 
disembark with 
weapons is treated as 
an import or export of 
the weapons. 
• Possession and storage 
requirements are 
developed by the 
Commonwealth and 
State and Territory 
legislation. 
 
 
 
 
 
• Notification, 
authorization, 
and storage 
information 
regarding 
firearms to 
appropriate 
agency is often 
required.  
• Security related 
incidents in 
territorial seas 
must be 
reported. 
242. See Responses Received on PCASP, INT’L MARITIME ORG., 
http://www.imo.org/ourwork/security/piracyarmedrobbery/pages/respo
nses-received-on-private%20armed%20security.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 
2013) (posting the different questionnaries that have been returned to 
the IMO). 
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Brazil 
• Requires 72-hour notice 
to the Brazilian Public 
Authority of: 
- the security team 
and firearms on 
board; 
- authorization 
documents for the 
security team and 
firearms from the 
flag country; 
- declaration  of the 
quantity and type of 
firearms, including 
the ammunition, 
consumables, spare 
parts, and 
maintenance 
equipment used by 
the security team; 
and  
- a list of security 
team members. 
• The embarkment or 
disembarkment of 
firearms is not allowed. 
 
 
 
 
 
• No requirements 
for ships carrying 
firearms leaving 
a port.  
• A detailed 
account of a 
security related 
incident must be 
reported to the 
Brazilian Public 
Authority as 
soon as the 
incident occurs.  
France 
• Requires 48 hour notice 
to the CROSS Reunion 
of the: 
- date and estimated 
arrival time of the 
ship in the territorial 
waters;  
- planned date and 
time of departure 
from territorial 
waters; 
- complete list of 
weapons and 
ammunition kept on 
board; 
• Same notification 
requirements for 
ships coming into 
its port.  
• Armed persons 
must not be 
visible on the 
exterior of the 
ship. 
• Weapons and 
ammunition 
must be kept in 
separate lockable 
places. 
• Declaration of 
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- identity of persons 
responsible for 
safekeeping and 
name and address of 
company to which 
they belong. 
• No requirements 
regarding notification of 
flag country 
authorization. 
• Regulations for 
embarking and 
disembarking with 
weapons are “complex” 
and the country is 
evaluating the different 
scenarios.  
security incident 
in territorial 
waters must be 
reported as soon 
as the incident 
happens.243   
Hong Kong 
• Requires 24-hour notice 
to the Marine 
Department of the Hong 
Kong SAR regarding 
information about 
firearms and 
ammunition. 
• The firearms and 
ammunition must remain 
on board in a locked 
container while in port.  
• No requirements for 
notification about the 
members of the security 
guard team. 
 
• Hong Kong has 
no territorial 
waters.    
Mauritius 
• Requires 24 hours 
(preferably 48 hours) 
notice to the Mauritius 
Revenue Authority of:  
- all the particulars of 
the firearms, such as 
model numbers, 
serial numbers, and 
caliber; 
• Foreign private 
security 
companies need 
to obtain prior 
authorization 
from the 
Government of 
Mauritius to 
operate in 
243. These incidents could only occur because of non-compliance with 
weapons regulations. 
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- the quantity and 
type of ammunition; 
- a list of guards with 
their full names, 
passport number, 
and nationality; 
- an authorization 
letter from the 
Commissioner of 
Police for authorizing 
transit and storage of 
firearms and 
ammunition through 
territorial waters. 
• All weapons must be 
stowed while the ship is 
in port.  
• Embarkment and 
disembarkment of 
weapons from private 
security guards is 
allowed with written 
authorization from the 
Commissioner of Police 
and with a list of the 
firearms and 
ammunition. 
• Flag country’s 
authorization of the 
weapons is required.  
territorial waters 
at least one 
month in 
advance. 
• The use of the 
weapons is 
prohibited in 
territorial waters. 
• Any security 
related incidents 
in territorial 
waters must be 
reported as soon 
as it occurs and 
no later than 
thirty minutes 
after it occurs. 
Panama 
• No notification 
requirements. 
• Required to 
report a security 
incident to the 
port facilities 
immediately 
after the incident 
occurs. 
 
Spain 
• Requires 24-hour notice 
of weapons according to 
Article 68.1 of the 
Weapons Regulation.  
• No specific notification 
required regarding the 
private security team 
onboard.  
• No requirements 
in place for 
weapons on a 
ship arriving or 
departing from 
ports. 
• Security 
incidents must 
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• No notification of flag 
country authorization 
required.  
• Embarkment is only 
permitted for Spanish 
private security 
companies and for ships 
traveling under the 
Spanish flag.  
be reported as 
soon as possible 
and must include 
an account of 
facts, including 
the weapons, 
personnel, ship 
and location of 
the incident. 
United 
States244  
• Notification of firearms 
held by private security 
teams must be given. 
• Information regarding 
the private security team 
members must be given.   
 
• Incidents must 
be reported to 
the Customs 
Boarder 
Protection Port 
Director as soon 
as they occur 
and must include 
location of the 
incident, 
description of 
what occurred, 
and the parties 
involved. 
 
 
244. In the questionnaire, the United States referred the questions to the 
appropriate departments of the government or regulations and did not 
specifically answer the questions.  
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